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INTRODUCTION 
With great power comes great responsibility. 
—Uncle Ben, Spider-Man1 
Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. 
—Baron Acton2 
 
The immense power of the prosecutor in the American 
criminal justice system cannot be overestimated.3  This is 
particularly so in a system of mandatory sentences and plea 
bargains, which provides the prosecution with substantial 
leverage against defendants.4  It is, therefore, distressing that 
prosecutors are among the least accountable legal actors in the 
criminal courtroom workgroup.5  A study conducted by the 
 
1 SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002). 
2 Letter from Lord Action to Bishop Creighton (1887), in 1 LOUISE CREIGHTON, 
LIFE AND LETTERS OF MANDELL CREIGHTON 372 ( 1904). 
3 Kay Levine & Malcolm M. Feeley, Prosecution, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 12224, 12224 (Neil J. 
Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001). 
4 MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN 
A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 156 (1992); Maximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: 
The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal 
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 224–25, 231 (2006); see Stuart S. Nagel, The 
Tipped Scales of American Justice, in LAW AND ORDER: THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 47, 
51 (Abraham Blumberg ed., 2d ed. 1973). 
5 Andrea Elliott & Benjamin Weiser, When Prosecutors Err, Others Pay the 
Price: Disciplinary Action Is Rare After Misconduct or Mistakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
21, 2004, at 25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/when-
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Center for Public Integrity found more than 2000 cases of 
prosecutorial misconduct that occurred between 1970 and 2003; 
these cases have resulted in dismissed charges, reversed 
convictions, and reduced sentences.6  Another study, conducted 
by Chicago Tribune reporters, uncovered staggering rates of 
conviction reversals due to prosecutorial misconduct.7  Such 
instances of misconduct are distressing enough in themselves but 
are made even worse in light of their contribution to perverse, 
unjust trial outcomes.  While the emphasis in wrongful 
conviction analysis has traditionally been on fault during the 
investigative stage, such as eyewitness identification error,8 a 
coerced false confession,9 and the use of a “jailhouse snitch[],”10 
government misconduct by the police or the prosecution accounts 
for as much as nineteen percent of wrongful convictions.11 
 
 
prosecutors-err-others-pay-price-disciplinary-action-rare-after-misconduct.html. See 
generally PETER F. NARDULLI, THE COURTROOM ELITE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978). The “workgroup” terminology comes 
from Eisenstein and Jacob. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: 
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1991). 
6 Elliott & Weiser, supra note 5. 
7 Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice 
Justice To Win: Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at N1; Ken 
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To 
Win: Prosecution on Trial in DuPage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at N1; Ken 
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To 
Win: Reversal of Fortune, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999, at N1; Ken Armstrong & 
Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To Win: The Flip 
Side of a Fair Trial, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at N1. 
8 Eyewitness identification error was a factor in 53.5% of wrongful convictions 
for capital crimes, making it the most ubiquitous error. Rob Warden, Exec. Dir., Ctr. 
for Wrongful Convictions, Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, How Mistaken and Perjured 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony Put 46 Innocent Americans on Death Row: An 
Analysis of Wrongful Convictions Since Restoration of the Death Penalty Following 
Furman v. Georgia (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
StudyCWC2001.pdf. 
9 Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 
30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 266, 270, 281–82 (1996); see also RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE 
INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 196 (2008). 
10 To the extent that some scholars say that this evidence should be 
inadmissible in death penalty cases, see Rory K. Little, Addressing the Evidentiary 
Sources of Wrongful Convictions: Categorical Exclusion of Evidence in Capital 
Statutes, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 965, 968, 971 (2008). 
11 Warden, supra note 8. 
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The Model Rules of Professional Conduct12 and the 
guidelines for prosecutors in the ABA Criminal Justice 
Standards13 provide very little in the way of guidance, beyond the 
vague directive to “seek justice.”14  A substantial number of 
prosecutors lose sight of the uniqueness of their position and the 
ethical obligations it entails, suggesting that these vague 
instructions are unhelpful.15  It is therefore imperative to 
examine the reasons for misconduct and to construct 
accountability structures that address them. 
While in some cases these incidents of misconduct are due to 
isolated malicious behavior, the literature on prosecutorial 
misconduct increasingly regards it as a broader phenomenon 
stemming from overzealousness and conviction-oriented “tunnel 
vision.”16  “The ideal of the justice system,” writes Jocelyn 
Pollock, “is that two advocates of equal ability will engage in a 
pursuit of truth, guided by a neutral judge. The truth is supposed 
to emerge from the contest.”17  The two advocates, however, do 
not share the same duties.  The prosecutor, while representing 
the people or the government, has an ethical duty “to seek 
justice, not merely to convict.”18  Therefore, while both sides may 
suffer from biases regarding the strength of their cases, these 
biases are more ethically problematic and have more severe 
implications when they characterize prosecutorial offices. 
This Article discusses the phenomenon of prosecutorial bias 
and its possible causes, effects, and remedies, in the context of 
Brady discovery violations.  As an example of the ineffectiveness 
of the existing legal approach to prosecutorial misconduct, the 
 
12 See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2011). 
13 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 3-
1.2(c) (1993) (providing that “[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not 
merely to convict”). 
14 R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach 
Us About a Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty To “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 
636–37 (2006). 
15 Robert Aronson & Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Use and Misuse of High-Tech 
Evidence by Prosecutors: Ethical and Evidentiary Issues, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 
1453–56 (2007). 
16 Id. at 1481. 
17 JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK, ETHICAL DILEMMAS & DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 230 (7th ed. 2012). 
18 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 3-
1.2(c) (1993); see also Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 
FORD. URB. L.J. 607, 608, 612, 642 (1999). 
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Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Connick 
v. Thompson.  In Connick, the Court denied the petitioner 
compensation for eighteen years wrongfully spent in prison for a 
murder and a robbery he did not commit, despite the fact that 
the conviction stemmed from prosecutorial nondisclosure of 
exculpatory evidence.19  The opinion of the Court, penned by 
Justice Thomas, has been criticized for its insensitivity to 
Thompson’s tragedy.20  This Article does not include a critique of 
the decision’s tenor, nor does it delve into federal court procedure 
technicalities.  Rather, it criticizes the Court’s understanding of 
prosecutorial intent and training from a social science 
perspective. 
The issue in Connick was whether the prosecution’s failure 
to disclose exculpatory evidence—deliberate dishonesty on the 
part of one prosecutor, aided by others in hiding his misdeed—
can amount to “deliberate indifference” on the part of the office 
for training prosecutors in Brady violations.21  But, as this Article 
argues, this debate misses the material point.  Classifying a 
prosecutorial misdeed as either an act of a malicious individual 
or as the failure of an office to properly train its employees 
creates a dichotomy between malice and good faith that fails to 
address the fundamental problem, which is the existence of a 
pervasive prosecutorial subculture that generates confirmation 
biases, tunnel vision, and huge personal investment in a guilty 
verdict.  Using literature from the classic empirical courtroom 
studies of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as recent cutting-edge 
studies in cultural cognition, this Article shows how a 
hyperadversarial system yields polarized organizational cultures, 
which hinder the ability of prosecutors and defense attorneys to 
see the other side’s perspective, and compromises not only the 
quality of lawyering but also the fate of both defendants and 
victims.  Ironically, by making prosecutors responsible for 
discovery, the Court has placed responsibility for discovery in the 
 
19 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1355–56 (2011) (finding a prosecutor’s office not liable to a 
wrongfully convicted suspect who spent fourteen years on death row after it failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence at his trial). The case is discussed in detail in Part I. 
20 Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas Writes One of the 
Meanest Supreme Court Decisions Ever, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2290036/ (arguing that the majority opinion shows empathy 
only to the prosecution). 
21 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358–60. 
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hands of those least likely to be able to perceive, interpret, and 
assess the evidence’s exculpatory potential.  Ultimately, neither 
legal remedy—sending a message through conviction reversal or 
inflicting punitive damages through a § 1983 verdict—is likely to 
be effective in eradicating Brady violations. 
Part I presents the problem through an analysis of the 
opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia’s concurrence, and Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent.  Part II shows the role played by causation 
and culpability in framing the responsibility of prosecutors in 
discovery proceedings.  Part III discusses the implications of 
discovery violations for § 1983 suits, in contrast to their role in 
direct and collateral review of the conviction itself.  Part IV 
presents evidence from a solid body of literature in sociology and 
political science, explaining why the debate misses the essential 
understanding of how prosecutorial offices work.  Part V tackles 
the thorny issue of prosecutorial, police, and judicial intent in 
constitutional violations, explaining why curbing § 1983 lawsuits 
to a narrow definition of respondeat superior is an inadequate 
solution for these violations.  Part VI provides a series of 
solutions and recommendations, in the spirit of toning down 
hyperadversarialism: encouraging personnel transition between 
prosecution and defense, putting people who have been on both 
sides in charge of professional training, and reforming the law 
school curriculum and bar exams to address the need to develop 
the cognitive skill to see an issue from all perspectives, through 
the use of persuasive memo writing and performance tests.  
Finally, the epilogue provides an agenda for a future empirical 
study on prosecutorial and defense perceptions of facts and case 
strengths. 
I. CONNICK V. THOMPSON: AN EXERCISE IN PROSECUTORIAL 
MISCONDUCT 
A. The Facts 
The respondent, John Thompson, brought a § 1983 lawsuit 
against Connick, District Attorney of Orleans Parish in 
Louisiana, for damages for eighteen years spent in prison,  
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fourteen of them on death row, for two unrelated crimes, neither 
of which he committed.22  The story behind this wrongful 
conviction is tragic and infuriating.23 
In 1984, Thompson was arrested for murder.24  Another man 
arrested with him, as part of a plea bargain, agreed to testify 
against Thompson in the murder trial.  As a result of the 
publicity following the murder charge, Thompson was identified 
by victims of an unrelated armed robbery as their attacker.25  
Thompson was charged with both offenses.26  The prosecution 
decided to proceed with the burglary trial first, because a 
conviction would rule out Thompson’s testimony in the murder 
trial and would allow them to seek the death penalty.27  The 
prosecutors did not disclose to the defense several important 
pieces of exculpatory evidence, including impeachment testimony 
and a blood sample taken from the crime scene.28  Thompson was 
convicted of burglary and subsequently chose not to testify in his 
murder trial,29 so as not to open the door to admission of the 
burglary conviction.  He was convicted for the murder30 too and, 
due to the former conviction, sentenced to death.31 
A month before Thompson’s scheduled execution, a miracle 
occurred:  A private investigator employed by the defense came 
across the blood sample taken from the crime scene almost 
twenty years before.32  The blood type did not match 
 
22 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355–56; John Thompson, Op. Ed., The Prosecution 
Rests, but I Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, at WK11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/opinion/10thompson.html?_r=2&pagewanted=1
&hp. 
23 For an overview of the facts, see Nina Totenberg, Man Wrongly Convicted: Are 
Prosecutors Liable?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/02/ 
135053529/man-wrongly-convicted-are-prosecutors-liable. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356. 
27 Totenberg, supra note 23. 
28 Id. It is important to note that the prosecutors did not know what Thompson’s 
blood type was at the time. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356. This detail became 
important later in the Supreme Court decision, but it also begs the undiscussed 
question why the police did not seek to establish a match. While this paper 
addresses prosecutorial, rather than police misconduct, hyperadversarialism might 
partially explain this glaring omission as well. 
29 Totenberg, supra note 23. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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Thompson’s.33  Thompson was retried, presented evidence that 
another man committed the crimes,34 and was acquitted of all 
charges. 
Unbeknownst to Thompson at the time, several years before 
the discovery—when he had already been on death row for 
years—one of the prosecutors, diagnosed with a terminal illness, 
revealed to another prosecutor that he had withheld the 
exculpatory evidence.35  Now aware of the misdeed, no one else in 
the prosecutor’s office did anything to bring this information to 
light.  After his exoneration, Thompson sued the prosecutor’s 
office for damages under § 1983.36  Connick conceded that the 
failure to disclose the blood sample was a Brady violation but 
argued that the violation could not be attributed to the 
municipality under § 1983 jurisprudence.37  The jury awarded 
Thompson fourteen million dollars in damages—a million for 
every year wrongfully spent on death row.38  A subsequent 
appellate decision noted that the robbery conviction 
unconstitutionally deprived Thompson of his right to testify in 
his own defense and so causally linked the prosecutors’ 
misconduct in the burglary case to the conviction in the murder 
case.39  The prosecutor’s office appealed the decision to the 
Supreme Court.40  On March 29th, the Supreme Court reversed, 
ruling in Connick’s favor.41 
 
33 Id. 
34 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357. Note that the other man, who was dead by the 
time of retrial, was the original arrestee who cut a deal with the prosecution and 
provided evidence against Thompson. Accepting his word without a doubt as to his 
objectivity, when he was initially arrested for the same crime, is another example of 
the legal blindness caused by hyperadversarialism. 
35 Lithwick, supra note 20. 
36 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. 
37 Id. at 1357. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1356–57. Note that this causality was not only foreseen; it was relied 
upon by the prosecutors, who chose to proceed with the burglary trial first. The 
fascinating issue of prosecutorial exploitation of multiple charges to manipulate the 
defendant’s right to testify merits further research and exceeds the framework of 
this paper. 
40 Id. at 1356. Note that this causality was not only foreseen; it was relied upon 
by the prosecutors, who chose to proceed with the burglary trial first. The 
fascinating issue of prosecutorial exploitation of multiple charges to manipulate the 
defendant’s right to testify merits further research and exceeds the framework of 
this paper. 
41 Id. at 1355–56. 
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B. Deliberate Indifference or Individual Misstep?: Justice 
Thomas’ Opinion 
Justice Thomas announced the decision of the Court, stating 
that under the doctrine exposing states to liability for 
constitutional violations, the failure to disclose the evidence in 
this case did not entitle Thompson to compensation.42 
Under the policy of the District Attorney’s Office, wrote 
Justice Thomas, prosecutors were to turn crime lab reports and 
other scientific evidence over to the defense.43  Despite this fact, 
and despite the prosecutors’ concession that failure to do so 
constituted a Brady violation, Justice Thomas declared it was 
unclear whether, not knowing Thompson’s blood type, the 
prosecution should have regarded the perpetrator’s blood type as 
exculpatory evidence requiring disclosure.44 
Even assuming that a Brady violation occurred, wrote 
Justice Thomas, government agencies are generally only 
responsible under § 1983 for their own actions, not those of their 
employees.45  In order to establish liability, a plaintiff has to 
prove that the violation was not some personal mishap on the 
part of one of the employees but rather the product of official 
agency policy.46  In this case, Thompson tried to link the 
activities of the particular group of prosecutors to the office policy 
by arguing that Connick failed to train his staff in their discovery 
obligations.47 
The standard for proving a failure to train is very high.  One 
way of proving failure to train requires plaintiffs to marshal 
impressive amounts of evidence, much of it regarding similar 
errors, to show that the municipality or institution exhibited 
“deliberate indifference” to the possibility of violation.48  In this 
case, stated the Court, this burden was not met.49  Evidence of 
similar Brady violations occurring in the same office is only 
relevant when such violations were of the same nature and 
 
42 Id. at 1366. 
43 Id. at 1357. 
44 Id. at 1357–58. 
45 Id. at 1359. 
46 Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); see also Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). 
47 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360–61. 
48 Id. at 1360; City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 822–23 (1985). 
49 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365. 
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occurred before the violation in the plaintiff’s case.50  Some of the 
violations Thompson presented occurred after he had already 
been convicted.51  Others did not involve a failure to disclose 
blood tests or scientific evidence specifically and therefore would 
not put Connick on notice that further training was needed.52 
The other path open to plaintiffs is based on City of Canton 
v. Harris.53  In Canton, the Supreme Court stated that in some 
cases the single constitutional violation would be so egregious 
that it, in itself, could prove lack of training.54  The Canton 
conditions, wrote Justice Thomas, were not met in Connick.55 
Finally, the Court found no causality between lack of 
training at the prosecutor’s office and the Brady violation.56  The 
Court wrote that attorneys learn about Brady and discovery as 
part of their law school education,57 even though in many 
institutions criminal procedure is not a mandatory part of the 
curriculum.  Their studies for the bar exam and continuing legal 
education requirements, to which they are subjected after 
certification, are additional opportunities to learn about the 
rules.58  Moreover, all attorneys are subject to a moral character 
vetting before admission to the bar.59  At the District Attorney’s 
 
50 Id. at 1360. 
51 Id. at 1360 & n.7. 
52 Id. at 1360. 
53 489 U.S. 378 (1989). 
54 Id. at 390 n.10 (1989) (stating the single-instance “Canton” hypothetical 
identified by the majority opinion in Connick). 
55 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361, 1363. The decision distinguishes between 
training for police officers (the hypothetical posed in Canton, which would show a 
city’s deliberate indifference to the “highly predictable consequence” that lack of 
training would lead to constitutional violations) and training for attorneys. See id. 
Ultimately, the high standard was not met. Id. at 1360, 1363–64. 
56 Id. at 1363 (“In light of this regime of legal training and professional 
responsibility, recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious consequence’ 
of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey the 
law.”) (quoting Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). 
57 Id. at 1363 (stating that the Canton hypothetical assumes a complete lack of 
knowledge on the part of police officers, and further stating that it is “undisputed 
here that the prosecutors in Connick's office were familiar with the general Brady 
rule”). 
58 Id. at 1361. It is worthwhile to note that several states, including Connecticut 
and Massachusetts, as well as the District of Columbia, do not require continuing 
legal education for their attorneys. MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications_cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
59 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1362 (citing LA. STATE BAR ASS’N ARTICLES OF INCORP. 
Art. 14 § 7 (1988)). Moral character requirements usually pertain to convictions and 
FINAL_AVIRAM 12/10/2013  4:08 PM 
2013] HYPERADVERSARIALISM 11 
office, newcomers are usually supervised by more experienced 
attorneys, from whom they might learn how to handle discovery 
requests and issues.60  In short, prosecutors, as opposed to police 
officers, the malfeasors in Canton, have more exposure to the 
general rules outlining their required conduct, which does away 
with the need for specific training on the matter.61  Thus, 
according to Justice Thomas, more training would not have 
prevented the individual misdeed in Thompson’s case, and the 
responsibility for his wrongful conviction did not lie with 
Connick. 
C. Was This a Brady Violation?: Justice Scalia’s Concurrence 
The concurring opinion went further than the majority in 
denying the causality between the lack of training and the failure 
to discover the evidence.  According to Justice Scalia, the 
question of whether there was a “pervasive culture of indifference 
to Brady” was irrelevant;62 the only question before the Court 
was whether “the need for training in constitutional 
requirements is so obvious ex ante that the municipality’s failure 
to provide that training amounts to deliberate indifference to 
constitutional violations.”63  Brady violations, said Justice Scalia, 
are inevitable;64 the nature of the violation here was highly 
personal.  Deegan, the prosecutor at fault, confessed to 
Riehlmann, “in the same conversation in which Deegan revealed 
that he had only a few months to live[,] that he had ‘suppressed 
blood evidence in the armed robbery trial of John Thompson that 
 
history of fraud or misrepresentation. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY (2011). The majority supposedly suggests that this background 
check might guarantee a lesser likelihood of fraud in practice. 
60 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1362. “[I]n the Orleans Parish District Attorney's 
Office, junior prosecutors were trained by senior prosecutors who supervised them as 
they worked together to prepare cases for trial, and trial chiefs oversaw the 
preparation of the cases. Senior attorneys also circulated court decisions and 
instructional memoranda to keep the prosecutors abreast of relevant legal 
developments.” Id. 
61 Id. at 1363. “A licensed attorney making legal judgments, in his capacity as a 
prosecutor, about Brady material simply does not present the same ‘highly 
predictable’ constitutional danger as Canton's untrained officer.” Id. 
62 Id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
63 Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)). 
64 Id. at 1367 (claiming that not only are Brady violations inevitable, but “[s]o 
are all species of error routinely confronted by prosecutors”). 
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in some way exculpated the defendant.’ ”65  In turn, Riehlmann 
kept quiet about the violation for five years.66  This, said Justice 
Scalia, was a “good-faith nondisclosure of a blood report not 
known to be exculpatory,” which no amount of training would 
prevent.67 
Because Riehlmann’s failure to come forward was an error 
made in good faith, said Justice Scalia, Thompson’s case could 
not be distinguished from the result in Arizona v. Youngblood.68  
In Youngblood, which dealt with destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence,69 the Court held that destruction of 
evidence only constituted a violation when done in bad faith.70  
With regard to good-faith violations, the rule is the same for 
nondisclosure and destruction.71  Justice Scalia speculated, 
Perhaps one day we will recognize a distinction between good-
faith failures to preserve from destruction evidence whose 
inculpatory or exculpatory character is unknown, and good-faith 
failures to turn such evidence over to the defense.  But until we 
do so, a failure to train prosecutors to observe that distinction 
cannot constitute deliberate indifference.72 
Justice Scalia finished his opinion “revealing” what he 
referred to as the “best-kept secret of this case,” which was that 
“[t]here was probably no Brady violation at all—except for 
Deegan’s (which, since it was a bad-faith, knowing violation, 
could not possibly be attributed to lack of training).”73  Anyone 
else’s shortcomings, which were supposedly not in bad faith, did 
not trigger a duty to train, and therefore did not generate 
liability on Connick’s part.74 
 
65 Id. at 1368. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1369 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)). 
69 In Youngblood, the evidence would have undoubtedly been exculpatory; 
Youngblood was exonerated in 2000 from his 1985 conviction. Arizona Exonerated, 
ARIZONA INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.arizonainnocenceproject.org/AzIP_4/ 
Exon.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
70 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. 
71 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1369. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. The smug tone of this assertion has triggered indignant critique. See, e.g., 
Lithwick, supra note 20. 
74 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1369–70. 
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D. Systemic Disregard?: Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent 
The essence of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent was that 
Thompson had met the burden of proof required by Canton: The 
evidence showed systemic flaws in the administration of 
discovery and compliance with Brady standards that could be 
prevented through appropriate training.  According to Justice 
Ginsburg, the evidence established “that misperception and 
disregard of Brady’s disclosure requirements were pervasive in 
Orleans Parish.”75  While this was demonstrated as a general 
trend within the office, the incident itself had such obvious 
markings of flagrant disregard of Brady duties that it satisfied 
the Canton requirements.76  Several prosecutors disregarded 
Thompson’s Brady rights.77  This disregard stemmed from a 
general animus and zeal-feeding prosecutorial policy in this 
case.78  Thompson’s conviction might explain this disregard:  The 
prosecution made a strategic choice to file the robbery charges 
first, so that Thompson would not testify at his murder trial and 
would have a conviction on record to present at the death penalty 
phase.79  Justice Ginsburg further pointed out that the case was 
not an example of a single isolated violation.80  Beyond the blood 
evidence incident, there were other examples of Brady violations 
in the trial:  The defense was not offered potential impeachment 
evidence,81 nor was it made aware that the eyewitness 
description in the original police report did not match 
Thompson.82 
Under these circumstances, argued Justice Ginsburg, “[t]he 
prosecutorial concealment Thompson encountered . . . is bound to 
be repeated unless municipal agencies bear responsibility . . . for 
 
75 Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 1377. 
77 Id. at 1370. 
78 For an example of the animus characterizing prosecutorial policy in this case, 
see id. at 1373 n.7 (citing the trial transcript that states, “During jury deliberations 
in the armed robbery case, Williams, the only Orleans Parish trial attorney common 
to the two prosecutions, told Thompson of his objective in no uncertain terms: ‘I’m 
going to fry you. You will die in the electric chair.’ ”). 
79 Id. at 1373 n.8. 
80 Id. at 1370. 
81 Id. at 1374. 
82 Id. (“Failure to produce the police reports setting out what the eyewitness 
first said . . . left defense counsel without knowledge that the prosecutors were 
restyling the killer's ‘close cut hair’ into an ‘Afro.’ ”). 
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adequately conveying what Brady requires and for monitoring 
staff compliance.”83  The majority’s position was particularly 
problematic because the office prosecutors had come “fresh out of 
law school”84 and their manual did not include a comment about 
impeachment evidence.85 
This set of factors, wrote Justice Ginsburg, satisfied the 
requirements set in Canton:  There was a certainty that the 
prosecutors would confront the situation; the situation involved a 
difficult choice or one where there had been a history of 
mishandling; and, as actually occurred in this case, the wrong 
choice would frequently cause a deprivation of rights.86 
II. BRADY AND DISCOVERY 
A. Discovery and Adversarialism 
The discovery obligation is a relatively new trend in the 
common law adversarial system.87  Its very nature conflicts with 
the concept of the trial as a “contest” between two teams, with 
the judiciary and jury playing only a secondary part;88 revealing 
one’s information entails relinquishing the advantage of 
surprise.89  It is no wonder, therefore, that its scope has been 
 
83 Id. at 1370. 
84 Id. at 1379 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85 Id. at 1381 (noting that “the manual did not acknowledge what Giglio v. 
United States made plain: Impeachment evidence is Brady material prosecutors are 
obligated to disclose” (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (citation 
omitted))). 
86 Id. at 1382 (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 & n.10 (1989)). 
87 Steven M. Smoot, Discovery in Texas Criminal Cases: How Far Have We 
Come?, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 91, 91 (1980). As Smoot points out, the concept of “trial by 
surprise” was common in the criminal justice world as recently as maybe thirty 
years ago; since then, reforms have pretty much eliminated trial by surprise in favor 
of extensive pretrial wrangling. 
88 Of course, this ideal has not been fully preserved in reality. See William B. 
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 371–72 
(2001). But some argue that in the criminal justice system it is more of a contest on 
behalf of the defense. The prominence of plea bargains in the system should not be 
seen as a fault in this model; as some argue, plea bargains are the logical conclusion 
of the adversarial process. See generally Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and 
the Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338, 340 (1982) (explaining 
several of the values unique to the adversarial system). 
89 Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 228, 249 (1964); see also Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in 
Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 19 (1995). 
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under debate in the United States and in a number of other 
jurisdictions,90 in which scholars and practitioners have 
presented arguments about the nature of the system.  Discovery 
is an important, albeit not the only, method for providing 
information on the case early on,91 allowing the parties to narrow 
the focus of trial when applicable.  However, in a system based 
primarily on plea-bargaining, it becomes particularly important, 
in that it allows the parties more control over assessing the value 
of the case and therefore may ease negotiations based on more 
information.92  Discovery is particularly important in 
determinate sentencing cases, because minute factual details 
may make a difference regarding the classification for sentencing 
purposes and will often be negotiated by the parties in the 
context of a plea.93 
The trend in state law, in general, has been toward an 
expansion of discovery rights; federal law has lagged behind the 
states in promoting pretrial discovery.94  Under most state law, 
the prosecution and the defense must, at a minimum, share their 
lists of witnesses with each other prior to trial.95  While this 
obligation pertains to both parties, it is particularly crucial that 
the prosecution, acting as an “officer of the court,” comply with 
it.96  Another important trend, also influenced by the prevalence 
 
90 In Canada, for example, one of the prosecutors interviewed by James Wilkins 
has critiqued the imbalance between prosecution and defense duties to disclose, 
arguing that the defense should be required to disclose as much evidence as the 
prosecution. James L. Wilkins, Discovery, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 355, 371–72 (1975–76). 
91 Timothy B. Heavner, Leaving No Stone Unturned: Alternative Methods of 
Discovery in Capital Cases, 7 CAP. DEF. DIG. 38, 38, 40 (1995) (suggesting the use of 
a subpoena duces tecum or the Freedom of Information Act). 
92 Debra S. Emmelman, Trial by Plea Bargain: Case Settlement as a Product of 
Recursive Decisionmaking, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 335, 345 (1996). 
93 Stephen H. Glickman & Steven M. Salky, Rediscovering Discovery: It’s Time 
To Overhaul the Rules To Ensure Fair Treatment for Defendants in Federal Cases, 4 
CRIM. JUST. 12, 14–15 (1989). Even in systems in which sentencing is less 
determinate and sentencing factors are listed in a statute, discovery of facts may be 
crucial. 
94 Id. at 14. 
95 JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
PROSECUTING CRIME 880–81 (4th ed. 2010). 
96 Tamara L. Graham, Death by Ambush: A Plea for Discovery of Evidence in 
Aggravation, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 321, 331 (2005). The symmetry between prosecution 
and defense is not the same in all states, and several countries, such as Israel and 
the UK, require almost unilateral discovery on the part of the prosecution, whereas 
most of the defense’s plan can be a surprise. M. Shalgi, Note, Criminal Discovery in 
Israel, 4 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 155, 158 (1966). Nonetheless, in almost all countries, there 
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of plea bargaining, has been an increasing informality in the 
discovery process, which in many settings is handled by direct 
communication between the parties, often without a specific 
request and without judicial intervention.97 
B. Subverting Adversarialism: Discovery of Exculpatory 
Evidence 
Brady v. Maryland’s mandate that the prosecution disclose 
exculpatory evidence98 is built upon previous decisions about 
prosecutorial mishandling of evidence.  In Mooney v. Holohan,99 
the Supreme Court pronounced a rule against presenting 
perjured evidence;100 Brady extended this rule from prohibiting 
false evidence to prohibiting the omission of exculpatory 
evidence.101  Echoing two Third Circuit Court decisions,102 the 
Court held that “suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, 
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”103 
For the purpose of discussing adversarialism and 
prosecutorial responsibilities, it is important to make two 
observations about Brady.  First, Brady explicitly rejects any 
requirement to prove mens rea on the part of the prosecutor.104  
Whether or not the lack of disclosure was due to bad faith, it is 
enough that the evidence was material to either guilt or 
sentence.105  This is a harm-oriented, rather than an intent-
 
is one piece of information that defendants must disclose: an alibi defense. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 85 (1970) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does 
not entitle a defendant in a criminal trial to refuse to disclose his alibi). 
97 Practices in this regard vary widely between states and even between 
prosecutorial offices. Wm. Bradford Middlekauff, What Practitioners Say About 
Broad Criminal Discovery Practice, 9 CRIM. JUST. 14, 16, 55–58 (1994). 
98 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
99 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). 
100 Id. at 112. 
101 Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. 
102 See id. (citing United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 
1952) and United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955)). 
103 Id. at 87. It is important to point out that, while some of the leading cases on 
Brady violations focused on evidence that went to the question of guilt, evidence 
useful for punishment mitigation is also “exculpatory evidence.” 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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oriented, rule.106  Second, and more importantly, the power of 
Brady is in its profound challenge of the adversarial “contest” 
model.  The rule makes an important statement about the duties 
the prosecution owes to the defendant and to the interest of 
justice.  Beyond refraining from making biased comments107 or 
creating biased jury panels,108 a rule requiring disclosure places 
an affirmative duty on the prosecution to help the defense make 
its case.  Evidence collected by the police for the purpose of 
securing a conviction must be placed in the hands of the defense, 
even though—or in fact, because—it might secure acquittal.109 
C. Responsibility for Discovery: The Agurs-Bagley Debate 
The revolutionary nature of the Brady rule, and 
complications resulting from its breadth and vagueness, required 
some elucidation in subsequent years.  In United States v. 
 
106 Based on causality rather than intent, this rule is similar to other criminal 
procedure rules, such as bail. It is different, however, from the rules about jury 
selection that have required intent. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986). 
In Batson, the Court held that a defendant may show violation of his or her right to 
a jury venire drawn from a cross-section of the community only by a showing of 
purposeful racial discrimination by the prosecutor. Id. The defendant must show 
that, in his or her jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to 
exclude members of the defendant’s “cognizable racial group” and must show such 
circumstances that “raise an inference that the prosecutor used [peremptory 
challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race.” Id. 
Later decisions expanded the grounds for a Batson challenge, but the test and intent 
required remained the same. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) 
(expanding Batson to cases which did not involve claimants and jurors of the same 
race but maintained the purposeful requirement of the discrimination). This leaves 
without remedy those who are harmed based on their race or other cognizable 
characteristic but who cannot show intent. Scholars examining implicit bias have 
argued compellingly that unconsciously held negative views about race affect our 
actions but cannot be shown to constitute intentional discrimination. See, e.g., Jerry 
Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of 
“Affirmative Action”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1076 n.69 (2006). 
107 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (holding that the right to 
be free of negative inferences based on a failure to testify extends to the sentencing 
stage in federal trials); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 305 (1981) (holding that 
defendants are entitled to have the jury instructed that no inference may be drawn 
from a defendant’s refusal to testify); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) 
(holding that a prosecutor’s comment on defendant’s failure to testify violated the 
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
108 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. 
109 See, e.g., Note, The Prosecutor’s Duty To Disclose to Defendants Pleading 
Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1005 (1986). 
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Agurs,110 the prosecution failed to disclose the victim’s previous 
convictions for violent crime, which would have supported a self-
defense argument.111  Justice Stevens discerned three situations.  
First was prosecutorial reliance on perjured testimony, in which 
case the standard for setting aside the verdict depends on 
applying a “strict standard of materiality.”112  Second, 
nondisclosure in reply to a request for specific evidence also 
requires a test of materiality upon appeal.113  Agurs presented a 
third situation.  In Agurs, the defense made no specific request 
for information.114  Rather, as became practice among defense 
attorneys at the time, there was a general request for Brady 
materials.  This, the Court stated, presented a difficulty: 
In many cases . . . , exculpatory information in the possession of 
the prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel.  In such a 
situation he may make no request at all, or possibly ask for “all 
Brady material” or for “anything exculpatory.”  Such a request 
really gives the prosecutor no better notice than if no request is 
made.  If there is a duty to respond to a general request of that 
kind, it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of 
certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor.  But if the 
evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it 
gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty 
should equally arise even if no request is made.  Whether we 
focus on the desirability of a precise definition of the 
prosecutor’s duty or on the potential harm to the defendant, we 
conclude that there is no significant difference between cases in 
which there has been merely a general request for exculpatory 
matter and cases, like the one we must now decide, in which 
there has been no request at all.115 
The Court in Agurs was therefore clearly trying to prevent 
abuse of Brady by the defense.  The difficulty is one that has to 
do with the burden placed upon the prosecutor.  The more 
interesting aspect of Agurs is that the limitation upon the 
prosecutor seems to be one of perception.  In other words, what 
concerned Justice Stevens was that prosecutors would be 
required to look for the evidence not only for the defense attorney 
 
110 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
111 Id. at 100–01. 
112 Id. at 103–04. 
113 Id. at 104. 
114 Id. at 102 n.4. 
115 Id. at 106–07. 
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but also with the eyes of a defense attorney, which went beyond 
what he considered a reasonable expectation.  Agurs, therefore, 
distinguishes between material evidence and evidence that has 
an “obviously exculpatory character.”116  The latter category 
includes crucial evidence, but that standard may be relaxed in 
the case of a verdict that “is already of questionable validity.”117 
This two-tier system concept was short lived, and the Court 
abolished it in United States v. Bagley.118  In Bagley, the defense 
requested information regarding whether undercover agents 
serving as witnesses for the prosecution had been compensated 
for their testimony against the defendant.119  Despite the fact 
that they had indeed been compensated, the prosecutor failed to 
disclose this fact, preventing the defendant from using the 
information as valuable impeachment evidence.120  Rejecting the 
two-tier system adopted in Agurs, Justice Blackmun found that a 
single causation test would suffice to cover all eventualities.121  
Regardless of whether there was a general request, a specific 
request, or no request at all, the defendant is entitled to a 
remedy only in material cases—that is, “only if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to 
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”122 
Bagley’s impact on state law was underwhelming.  New 
York, for example, explicitly rejected its materiality test and 
retained the Agurs two-tier standard.123  Post-Bagley, no 
jurisdiction reduced the scope of pretrial discovery.124  In 
addition, the Rules of Professional Conduct for prosecutors 
continued to advocate a broad Brady standard of disclosure even 
absent a request from the defense, requiring the prosecution to 
disclose without request “[a]ny material or information within 
 
116 Id. at 107, 109–11. 
117 Id. at 113. 
118 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
119 Id. at 669–70. 
120 Id. at 670–72. 
121 Id. at 682. 
122 Id.. 
123 People v. Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d 67, 77–78, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920–21, 556 N.Y.S.2d 
518, 523–24 (1990). 
124 Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal To 
Improve the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Court of the District 
of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 641, 657 (1989). 
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the prosecutor’s possession or control which tends to negate the 
guilt of the defendant as to the offense charged or which would 
tend to reduce the punishment of the defendant.”125 
Moreover, informal practices of broad discovery remained the 
norm in various locales.  In a survey of practitioners, it was 
reported that only a quarter of all cases entailed any judicial 
involvement in the discovery process, and many defense 
attorneys reported receiving more discovery than required by 
state law,126 though this tendency was reported by some to be 
more common among “rookie” prosecutors127 or when the 
prosecution had a strong case and wanted to encourage a plea 
bargain.128  Despite declining constitutional protections, 
therefore, the practicalities of the workday have yielded and 
maintained a de facto broader discovery norm than required by 
Supreme Court case law. 
D. When Bad Faith Matters: Destruction of Evidence and 
Youngblood 
As mentioned above, prosecutorial mens rea, or bad faith, 
was deemed unimportant when assessing the need to disclose 
exculpatory evidence.129  However, the Court established an 
intent-based rule with regard to the destruction of potentially 
exculpatory evidence.130  In Arizona v. Youngblood, the 
prosecution lost samples of a sexual assault kit, leading to 
Youngblood’s conviction for child molestation.131  Had the court 
employed the guilt-free prejudice test from the Brady-Bagley line 
of cases, the sample analysis might have completely exonerated 
Youngblood, who, as it turned out, was indeed exonerated in 
2000.132  Rather than adopting an outcome-oriented test as in 
Agurs or Bagley, the Supreme Court reasoned, “[o]ur decisions in 
related areas have stressed the importance for constitutional 
 
125 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY 
§ 11-2.1 (3d ed. 1996). 
126 Middlekauff, supra note 97, at 17. 
127 Id. at 17. 
128 Id. It may well be that wholesale disclosure, especially in the digital age, 
could hide exculpatory evidence in a forest of marginally relevant “trees.” 
129 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
130 Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). 
131 Id. at 54. 
132 Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood: Due Process, Lost 
Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 243–44 (2008). 
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purposes of good or bad faith on the part of the Government 
when the claim is based on loss of evidence attributable to the 
Government.”133  Expressing concern about obliging the police to 
preserve evidence indefinitely, the Supreme Court refused to find 
a due process violation where the destruction could “at worst be 
described as negligent.”134 
As with Bagley, the impact of Youngblood was rather 
limited.135  While a few states—California,136 Arizona,137 Maine, 
and Ohio138—adopted a “bad faith” standard for destruction of 
evidence, most states deviated from this precedent, making bad 
faith immaterial for finding due process violations.139  Later 
developments further eroded the Youngblood doctrine.  The 
exculpatory and incriminatory potential of DNA evidence has 
dramatically increased, as has public awareness to the 
importance of such evidence.140  Increasing numbers of 
exonerations have propelled forty-three states, the District of 
Columbia, and the federal government, to create legislation 
allowing for post-conviction DNA testing under certain 
circumstances, and, perhaps as a consequence, seventeen states, 
the District of Columbia, and the federal government now impose 
a “blanket” duty to preserve evidence.141  Norman Bay attributes 
these developments to a preference for fairness over 
instrumental “education” of prosecutors.142 
 
 
133 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57. 
134 Id. at 58. 
135 Daniel R. Dinger, Should Lost Evidence Mean a Lost Chance To Prosecute?: 
State Rejections of the United States Supreme Court Decision in Arizona v. 
Youngblood, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 329, 333–34 (2000) (noting Youngblood’s argument 
on appeal that testing the destroyed evidence could have conclusively proved the 
identity of the true assailant, thus exonerating him); see also Youngblood, 488 U.S. 
at 54–55. 
136 Dinger, supra note 135, at 343–44. 
137 Id. at 344–46. 
138 Id. at 346–47. 
139 Id. at 356. 
140 Bay, supra note 132, at 279–80. 
141 Id. at 284. 
142 Id. at 287. 
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III. INTERLUDE: DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
§ 1983 LAWSUITS 
A survey of discovery law reveals a complicated set of 
expectations from prosecutors.  In general, the prosecution’s 
monopoly over police-collected evidence has imposed a fiduciary 
duty of sorts to disclose exculpatory evidence in its hands to the 
defense.143  Post-Brady case law and legislation has focused on 
defining the extent to which it is fair to require prosecutors’ 
compliance with this duty.  The applicable case law and 
legislation feature two distinct schools of thought on the 
circumstances that should trigger mandatory discovery.  
Causation, exemplified by the Agurs-Bagley-Vilardi debate, turns 
on how material a piece of evidence must be in order for its 
nondisclosure to be an issue requiring remedy.144  Culpability was 
the pivotal issue in Agurs and Youngblood.145  Agurs emphasized 
the excessive burden of combing a case looking for evidence not 
specifically requested, and Youngblood limited prosecutorial 
liability by imposing a bad faith standard.146  These divergent 
standards reflect a broader debate over whether the role of 
remedies for constitutional violations is to right wrongs for the 
particular defendant or teach law enforcement authorities a 
lesson.  The post-Warren Courts have moved away from the 
practice of creating constitutional rules for deterrence purposes 
and toward more vague outcome-oriented, totality-of-the-
circumstances tests.147  In the discovery context, this trend 
explains why discovery violations are acknowledged only to the 
extent that they materially contributed to the conviction, and 
also why the Court may be skeptical about deterring 
prosecutorial behavior in evidence destruction cases that did not 
 
143 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963). 
144 See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111–12 (1976). 
145 See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. 
146 See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110; see also Bay, supra 
note 132, at 284, 302–06 (analyzing the interplay of these two ideas in the post-
Youngblood legislation and litigation). 
147 CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 6–7 (5th ed. 2007); Peter 
Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger 
Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 247 (1983); Hadar Aviram & Daniel 
L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept of Equity into 
Constitutional Review of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 422 (2009). 
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involve bad faith.148  What it does not explain is the distinction 
between the outcome-oriented standard in nondisclosure cases 
and the intent-oriented standard in destruction cases.149 
In Connick v. Thompson, prosecutorial discovery misconduct 
was discussed in a different procedural context than the above 
cases.  Having already been exonerated, Thompson did not sue to 
seek a reversal of his conviction, but rather to seek financial 
redress by placing responsibility upon the shoulders of his 
wrongdoers.150  On one hand, the two proceedings are 
fundamentally different.  In the § 1983 context, focus is shifted 
away from the outcome of the criminal trial, which has already 
been resolved, and toward the law enforcement agency itself.  
Thompson’s New York Times op-ed, criticizing the Supreme 
Court’s decision, ended with the words, “A crime was definitely 
committed in this case, but not by me.”151  The lawsuit, therefore, 
could be perceived as the trial of the wrongdoers, and therefore 
needs to probe deeper into their culpability.  On the other hand, a 
broader understanding of wrongful convictions suggests that 
seeking financial compensation for years wrongfully spent in 
prison could, and perhaps, should be seen as an integral part of 
the “remedy package,” rather than as a deterrent or educational 
device.  Also, the comparison between the two proceedings raises 
the question of efficiency—that is, which of the two proceedings 
is more likely to ensure prosecutorial compliance and ethical 
behavior in the future?  While some see reversals and overturned 
convictions as powerful tools of deterrence,152 this may be simply 
 
148 Cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137 (2009) (holding that where 
“the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest[,] . . . the 
jury should not be barred from considering all the evidence”); see also Hadar Aviram 
et al., Moving Targets: Placing the Good Faith Doctrine in the Context of Fragmented 
Policing, 37 FORD. URB. L.J. 709, 712 (2010). 
149 In Thompson, Scalia expressed at least an open mind to the possibility that 
the two standards should converge. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1369 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Perhaps one day we will recognize a distinction 
between good-faith failures to preserve from destruction evidence whose inculpatory 
or exculpatory character is unknown, and good-faith failures to turn such evidence 
over to the defense.”). 
150 Id. at 1355 (majority opinion). 
151 Thompson, supra note 22, at 2. 
152 This is comparable to the Fourth Amendment debate on the effectiveness of 
the exclusionary rule versus other compliance-inducing mechanisms, and some have 
suggested that the exclusionary rule (a within-trial remedy) has proven the best 
deterrent technique. SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF 
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990, at 49–50 (1993) (citing the 
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due to their availability.  More criminal defendants will appeal 
their convictions than sue under § 1983.  On the other hand, 
remedies under § 1983 are available to address government 
wrongdoing beyond the confines of the criminal process, to people 
who were never convicted or even tried. 
The common issue underlying all of these considerations is 
one that is rarely explored in case law:  Whether, generally 
speaking, prosecutorial practice is conducive to developing the 
skills to spot exculpatory evidence, let alone to assess its 
strength.  Prosecutorial misconduct allegations are not 
uncommon.  For example, 
[t]he Center for Public Integrity cited nearly six-hundred Texas 
appeals from 1970 until 2003 where defendant raised 
allegations of prosecutor misconduct. . . . In 152 of those cases, a 
court held the prosecutor’s conduct prejudiced the defendant, 
resulting in a reversal and a remand of the conviction, sentence 
or indictment.  Five of these defendants later proved their 
innocence.153 
Examining discovery violations as examples of the broader 
phenomenon of prosecutorial misconduct, rather than on a case-
by-case basis, reveals the narrowness and inadequacy of both 
intent-oriented and outcome-oriented regimes.  If discovery 
violations stem from the experience of prosecutorial practice, 
individual malice or lack thereof becomes irrelevant to the 
outcome.  The individual prosecutor should pay a professional 
price for her malice, but this malice is actually the product of a 
fertile organizational Petri dish.  If inattention to, and disregard 
for, the possibility of innocence is a broad organizational 
phenomenon, the cases in which convictions are overturned, and 
the fewer cases in which exonerations occur, are merely a 
window into a more general culture of indifference.  The next 
Part uses insights from both surveys of prosecutors and cultural 
cognition studies to demonstrate the existence of such a culture,  
 
 
 
exclusionary rule as contributing to significant reforms in the practice of law 
enforcement and criminal procedure in, for example, Chicago). For a colossal 
misunderstanding of this argument’s implications, see generally Scalia’s opinion in 
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 587–602 (2006). 
153 Kelly Gier, Note, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct, 33 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 191, 193 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
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and as a consequence, to suggest that the legal framing of 
prosecutorial misconduct through the lenses of either causation 
or culpability is overly narrow and inadequate. 
IV. LEGAL BLINDNESS: WHY PROSECUTORS DO NOT SEE 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
A. The Prosecutorial Organizational Culture 
The reasons for prosecutorial misconduct are complex, and 
analyzing those reasons depends on the focus of one’s lens.  From 
an ethical perspective, prosecutorial behavior is a reflection of 
the individual prosecutor’s set of values and commitment to 
justice; as Michael Cassidy argues, various legally nebulous 
dilemmas faced by prosecutors can be solved through an appeal 
to personal virtues.154  For example, the dilemma over whether to 
enter into a plea bargain with a turncoat accomplice155 implicates 
virtues of courage and honesty.156  Others, while acknowledging 
the important role of office culture in generating a sense of office 
ethics, still regard ethics as an individual virtue.  In a candid 
insider’s piece, Patrick Fitzgerald mentions the importance of 
hiring ethical candidates because such candidates are less likely 
to be corrupted in an environment of faulty ethics.157  He also 
emphasized the importance of good supervisors in creating an 
ethical environment.158  “Management has to have confidence 
that when they find that piece of Brady material on a Saturday 
afternoon, they will turn it over.  If you do not have that 
confidence, you must take action.”159  However, as compared with 
other flaws or challenges an attorney may overcome, “when the 
issue is credibility and ethics, then that is something you cannot 
work with.  A person either has it or does not, and ethics is an 
area where an office cannot compromise or bend.”160 
 
154 Cassidy, supra note 14, at 660, 693. 
155 Id. at 654. 
156 Id. at 660–61. 
157 Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Thoughts on the Ethical Culture of a Prosecutor’s 
Office, 84 WASH. L. REV. 11, 13–15, 17–18 (2009). Fitzgerald’s Article emphasizes 
that hiring ethical attorneys is one of a supervising attorney’s many obligations in 
establishing an ethical office. Id. 
158 Id. at 20. 
159 Id. at 21. 
160 Id. at 22. 
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Other commentators, however, attribute prosecutorial 
misconduct to the broader set of social and organizational 
circumstances underlying their work.  Peter Joy ascribes it to the 
broader prosecutorial work environment, arguing that the fact 
that head prosecutors are elected creates pressure to maintain a 
“tough on crime” image to appeal to the public.161  
But even without the broader political context, there are 
workday-related variables that affect the quality of prosecutorial 
behavior.  Criminal courtroom ethnographers have consistently 
argued that the realities of the criminal process create strong 
incentives to overcharge and to bargain.  In 1964, Herbert Packer 
posited two models of the criminal process: a crime control model, 
emphasizing efficiency and a strong reliance on the investigative 
phase, and a due process model, emphasizing concern about 
wrongful conviction and providing constitutional safeguards 
limiting police and prosecutorial discretion.162  Packer’s models 
reflected his impression of the constitutional revolution of the 
1960s, spearheaded by the Warren Court.  This revolution was 
characterized by a series of decisions incorporating the criminal 
justice provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth 
Amendment and thus applying them to the states.  Although the 
trend was largely reversed in later years, some of its effects, as 
well as its symbolic import, remained.163  Some of these decisions 
created limitations on prosecutorial discretion164 and behavior in 
the courtroom,165 as well as during bargaining.166  Social 
 
161 Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 
399, 405. 
162 HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). For more 
about the models, see generally Hadar Aviram, Packer in Context: Formalism and 
Fairness in the Due Process Model, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (2011); Stuart 
Macdonald, Constructing a Framework for Criminal Justice Research: Learning from 
Packer’s Mistakes, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 257 (2008); Kent Roach, Four Models of the 
Criminal Process, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 671 (1999).  
163 Arenella, supra note 147, at 185. Packer later grew disillusioned with the 
post-Warren Court decisions, expressing disappointment with due process at the end 
of his life. Aviram, supra note 162, at 244 n.1. 
164 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974) (“A person convicted of an offense 
is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that 
the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, 
thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration.”). 
165 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
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scientists, however, had less faith in the Warren Court decisions’ 
potential to reform the criminal process.  Reviewing Packer’s 
book in 1969, Abraham Blumberg observed that the models hid a 
reality that was closer to the crime control model: a system 
guided mostly by efficiency and plea-bargaining, more visible in 
the world of assembly-line cases in lower courts than in the 
echelons of the Supreme Court.167  Even more incisive was 
Malcolm Feeley’s observation that the two models were in fact 
made of the same fabric.168  Due process, Feeley argued, was a 
normative, idealized concept generated by the Warren Court’s 
constitutional rulings, masking the empirical reality, which was 
actually much closer to Packer’s crime control model.169  Doreen 
McBarnet pushed this angle further by arguing that the veneer 
of due process exists for the purpose of securing convictions 
under the guise of legitimacy, and therefore “due process is for 
crime control.”170  These critics suggested that the contrast 
between the models was false.171  The image of the criminal trial 
as gleaned from Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s consisted 
of normative edicts to adhere to bright-line rules in police 
procedure and refrain from unchecked discretion.  This set of 
bright-line rules was subsequently eroded by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, in decisions that granted police officers and 
prosecutors more leeway and expressed more trust in their 
professional judgment.172  Even at its height, the due process 
model did not trickle down to police stations and lower courts, 
 
166 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in 
any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be 
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled”). 
167 Abraham S. Blumberg, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 790, 791 (1969) 
(reviewing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968)). 
168 FEELEY, supra note 4, at 25–28 (discussing the commonalities between the 
two traditional models); see also Malcolm M. Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower 
Courts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461, 462–63 (1979) (stating that “[d]iscussions of plea 
bargaining often conjure up images of a Middle Eastern bazaar” involving haggling 
over each case, when in fact such negotiations “are more akin to modern 
supermarkets,” in which there is a “going rate” for each offense). The charade serves 
to convince defendants of their attorney’s efforts on their behalf and to mollify them 
to accept a “deal” rather than going through the expense and humiliation of a trial 
certain to end in conviction. Id. at 464–65. 
169 See FEELEY, supra note 4 at 26–27. 
170 DOREEN J. MCBARNET, CONVICTION 156 (1981). 
171 Id.; see also FEELEY, supra note 4, at 25–28; Blumberg, supra note 167 
(critiquing Packer’s findings on the basis of several social science studies). 
172 Arenella, supra note 147, at 192–93. 
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where police maneuvering and plea bargains proliferated.  Police 
officers relied on race and class for profiling purposes, and a 
culture of lies permeated the system.173  Interrogations designed 
to circumvent Miranda and other safeguards yielded waivers of 
the right to silence, and the court’s reliance on the resulting 
confessions as probative evidence created a disincentive to seek 
other types of evidence.174  More pertinent to the topic of this 
Article is the fact that prosecutors operate in a system in which 
more than ninety percent of all cases are disposed via plea 
bargains.175  In this system, prosecutors overcharge and establish 
a sentencing “menu” for particular crimes to promote early plea 
bargaining.176  In short, much of the character of modern criminal 
justice, including prosecutorial behavior and decisionmaking, 
was established by the organizational culture of the police station 
and the courtroom, rather than by any form of malicious design 
on the part of a few interested parties. 
An important part of this organizational culture lies in what 
Packer referred to as the “presumption of guilt.”177  Rather than 
being an evidentiary counterbalance to the presumption of 
innocence, the presumption of guilt is a statement of statistical 
confidence.  Under this paradigm, law enforcement personnel, 
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys assume that anyone 
whose case passes through police investigation and a 
prosecutorial decision on charging has a high probability of being 
guilty of the offense of which he or she is accused.178  If the 
process provides the police and prosecution with adequate power 
and discretion, it may dispense with formalities and safeguards 
 
173 JERRY H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 73–76, 230–31 (4th ed., 2011). 
174 Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, supra 
note 9, at 284. 
175 Douglas Savitsky, The Problem with Plea Bargaining: Differential Subjective 
Decision Making as an Engine of Racial Stratification in the United States Prison 
System 3 (Ctr. for the Study of Econ. & Soc’y, Working Paper No. 52), available at 
http://www.economyandsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/wp52_Savitsky_Plea 
Bargaining.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
176 EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 5, at 104; Feeley, Pleading Guilty in Lower 
Courts, supra note 168, at 464; David Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features 
of the Penal Code in a Public Defender Office, 12 SOC. PROBS. 255, 258 (1965). See 
generally MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF 
PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1981); NARDULLI, supra note 5. 
177 PACKER, supra note 162, at 160–61. 
178 Id. at 160. 
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once the case comes to trial.179  The resulting criminal practices 
are not, therefore, rooted in malice or trigger-happiness on the 
part of prosecutors, but rather in an assumption that defendants 
are guilty and securing their convictions is a priority.180  Alan 
Dershowitz provides a simplified version of this practical modus 
operandi, which he refers to as the “thirteen Rules of the 
Criminal Justice Game”: 
Rule I:  Most criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty. 
Rule II:  All criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors and judges 
understand and believe Rule I. 
Rule III:  It is easier to convict guilty defendants by violating 
the Constitution than by complying with it, and in some cases it 
is impossible to convict guilty defendants without violating the 
Constitution. 
Rule IV:  Many police lie about whether they violated the 
Constitution in order to convict guilty defendants. 
Rule V:  All prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys are 
aware of Rule IV. 
Rule VI:  Many prosecutors implicitly encourage police to lie 
about whether they violated the Constitution in order to convict 
guilty defendants. 
. . . . 
Rule XI:  Most judges and prosecutors would not knowingly 
convict a defendant who they believe to be innocent of the crime 
charged (or a closely related crime).181 
While Dershowitz’s rules are framed as practitioners’ 
impressions of the process, there is a body of social science 
literature confirming the existence of a prosecutorial 
organizational culture that adopts a presumption of guilt.182  The 
adherence to a presumption of guilt is engrained in the history of 
the prosecutorial role.  The modern conception of a public officer-
prosecutor is fairly new; at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
criminal justice process was still initiated by private citizen 
complainants and mitigated merely by the discretion of 
 
179 Id. at 160–61. 
180 Id.  
181 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, LETTERS TO A YOUNG LAWYER 80–81 (2001). 
182 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some 
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1621–22 (2006). 
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magistrates and top police officers.183  The emergence of 
independent office holders was a response to biased and corrupt 
police practices, tied to contemporary concerns associated with 
prohibition and gambling enforcement.184  However, upon the 
establishment of a district attorney’s office, the new office holders 
quickly adapted to the political landscape and positioned 
themselves at the forefront of raiding and arrest activities, 
expressing cynical views toward the subjects of those activities.185  
This notion is so prevalent that it is widely affirmed by popular 
culture, which constantly reminds us that the presumption of 
innocence is widely regarded by prosecutors as legal fiction.186 
What were the implications of this organizational culture for 
discovery practices?  In a 1994 survey of practitioners, the 
nineteen prosecutor interviewees expressed mixed feelings about 
the practice of broad discovery.187  The interviewees 
acknowledged that having a broad practice of discovery 
encouraged efficient proceedings regardless of the defendant’s 
guilt, presumably because of the increased likelihood of reaching 
a plea bargain.188  They expressed concerns, however, about 
potential intimidation of victims or witnesses whose identities 
would become known, as well as about the possibility of 
compromising informants.189  Interviewees also had the general 
sense that the discovery process was an unreciprocated “one-way 
street” from prosecutors to defense attorneys.  By providing the 
defense with a broad range of information, “bad guys” were 
allowed to beat the system.190  In an organizational culture that 
 
183 Allen Steinberg, The “Lawman” in New York: William Travers Jerome and 
the Origins of the Modern District Attorney in Turn-of-the-Century New York, 34 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 753, 754 (2003). 
184 Id. at 759–60. 
185 Id. at 767. 
186 Christine Alice Corcos, Prosecutors, Prejudices and Justice: Observations on 
Presuming Innocence in Popular Culture and Law, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 793, 796 
(2003). See generally Michael M. Epstein, For and Against the People: Television’s 
Prosecutor Image and the Cultural Power of the Legal Profession, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 
817 (2003). Epstein highlights an important point. The representation of ‘good’ 
defense attorneys, such as Perry Mason, essentially aligns them with a prosecutorial 
role: Mason acquits defendants on grounds of factual innocence while at the same 
time implicating the real guilty party in the crime, affirming the commitment to 
actual guilt. Id. at 827. 
187 Middlekauff, supra note 97, at 15–16. 
188 Id. at 17. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 16. 
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believes in guilt, it is not difficult to see how this mentality 
creates a tension between the wish to disclose enough 
incriminating evidence to guarantee cooperation and incentivize 
guilty pleas, while not disclosing information that might just help 
a guilty defendant win an acquittal on what is perceived to be a 
technicality. 
This discussion prompts a different question:  What 
generates the presumption of guilt in the first place, and how 
does it impact Brady practices?  For an answer, the next section 
turns to social psychology literature and confirmation bias. 
B. Facts and Opinion: Insights from Cultural Cognition, Social 
Psychology, and Studies of Prosecutorial Culture 
Consider the following illustration: 
 
FIG. 1 
 
 
This optical illusion developed by Edgar Rubin demonstrates 
how the same object can be seen in two mutually incompatible 
ways: a vase or two profiles.191  Which shape the viewer perceives 
depends on the way he or she resolves the figure-ground problem; 
the viewer can see either shape, but not both. 
Evidence in a criminal case in an adversarial system can be 
conceptualized using the face-vase metaphor.  Facts pertaining to 
a case can be seen to support a conclusion of guilt or innocence, 
depending on perspective.  Granted, in some cases, such as when 
DNA evidence is provided, one conclusion may be more salient 
 
191 EDGAR RUBIN, SYNSOPLEVEDE FIGURER fig.3 (1915). For more on optical 
illusions and their neurological explanation, see generally Uri Hasson et al., Vase or 
Face? A Neural Correlate of Shape-Selective Grouping Processes in the Human 
Brain, 13 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 744 (2001). 
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than the other, and therefore more likely agreed upon.192  But 
many pieces of evidence, including witness testimonies and even 
defendant confessions, possess strengths and weaknesses and are 
therefore open to interpretation.  The premise of an adversarial 
system is that both parties examine the same evidence and 
provide the jury with conflicting perspectives regarding its 
strength.  But do the parties themselves see the evidence in 
conflicting ways?  Research on social psychology and cultural 
cognition responds in the affirmative, and suggests that the 
source of distortion is not a neurological issue but rather a 
psychological phenomenon known as confirmation bias. 
Confirmation bias is a mechanism that affects how we 
interpret information.193  The theory behind the bias is that 
humans do not approach new information with an entirely blank 
mind.  Rather, we perceive information through our already-
tainted perspective, complete with our prior opinions and biases.  
We tend to be attached to our perception, and therefore seek 
information that confirms our already-solidified perspective and 
resist persuasion to the contrary.194 
Studies conducted by cultural cognition scholars consistently 
find confirmation bias operating in legal and political matters.195  
In survey experiments, subjects consistently view not only 
opinions, but facts and hard evidence, through the prism of their 
political and social worldviews.196  One such study examined 
 
192 In some cases, the very fact that the evidence is “scientific” lends it more 
credibility as conducive to a conclusion of guilt, a phenomenon known as the “CSI 
Effect.” See, e.g., Arun Rath, Is the “CSI Effect” Influencing Courtrooms?, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/06/133497696/is-the-csi-effect-
influencing-courtrooms; see also Donald E. Shelton, The “CSI Effect”: Does It Really 
Exist?, 259 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 1 (Mar. 2008), available at http://nij.gov/nij/journals/ 
259/csi-effect.htm (reporting a survey indicating that viewers of CSI were likely to 
have a higher standard for scientific evidence and to expect scientific evidence, but 
suggesting that those expectations may be rationally related to the types of cases 
that are likely to include such evidence). 
193 Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The 
Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979). 
194 JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 195–96 (4th ed. 2008). 
195 For information on the cultural cognition project at Yale University, see 
generally YALE LAW SCH., THE CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT, 
http://www.culturalcognition.net/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
196 See e.g., Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. 
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 867, 870 
(2009). 
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public perceptions using Scott v. Harris197 as a case study.  Scott 
was a § 1983 lawsuit arguing that a police chase caused an 
accident that left the plaintiff permanently disabled.198  In 
reversing the district court decision, Justice Scalia referred to a 
police video introduced as evidence, arguing that the video 
clearly showed that the plaintiff endangered the public and the 
police, thus justifying the police chase.199  Seeking to question the 
assumption that any possible reasonable juror would perceive the 
evidence in the same way, the researchers presented a thousand 
respondents with the video and asked them whether the plaintiff 
had in fact posed the kind of danger that justified the chase.200  
The findings cast doubt on Justice Scalia’s assumption that the 
video would “speak for itself.”201  While most subjects agreed that 
the plaintiff posed some risk, there was disagreement not only 
regarding the normative question whether the police chase was 
justified but also regarding the degree of danger posed by the 
plaintiff.202  The subjects’ varied opinions correlated with their 
worldviews.203  Subjects with a hierarchical—conservative, 
individualistic, free-market-oriented—worldview were 
significantly more likely to perceive Harris’ driving as more 
dangerous than subjects subscribing to an egalitarian—
progressive, communitarian, welfarist—worldview.204 
In a similar study, subjects were presented with a 
hypothetical acquaintance-rape scenario based on 
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz205 and were randomly assigned 
different legal definitions of rape.206  They were asked to 
comment on the extent of their agreement with a series of factual 
statements—for example, whether the victim consented; whether 
the perpetrator believed that the victim had consented—as well 
 
197 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
198 Id. at 374–76. 
199 Id. at 378 n.5 (providing a URL for the video and stating that the Court was 
happy “to allow the videotape to speak for itself”). 
200 Kahan et al., supra note 196, at 854–57. 
201 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5. 
202 Kahan et al., supra note 196, at 865–66 & figs. 2–4. 
203 Id. at 867. 
204 Id. at  879 (noting the distinction between hierarchical and egalitarian 
worldviews as used in other cultural cognition literature). 
205 Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994). 
206 Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and 
Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 767 (2010).  
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as with legal conclusions—for example, the perpetrator should be 
found guilty of rape.207  The main finding was that the subjects’ 
worldviews, rather than legal definitions, were the determining 
factor in establishing whether the defendant understood the 
victim to have consented to intercourse.208  Subjects with 
hierarchical, individualistic worldviews tended to infer consent 
significantly more readily than subjects with egalitarian, 
communitarian perspectives.209  This difference was found 
particularly between hierarchical and egalitarian female 
subjects.210  Interestingly, the legal definitions did not make any 
significant difference in the inferences made by subjects 
regarding either facts or law.211 
Cultural cognition studies identify confirmation bias as a 
function of worldview.  But can confirmation bias be generated by 
a mere prompt for a partisan position? Apparently, in some 
situations, yes.  Perhaps the most famous illustration of role-
induced perception of reality is the Stanford prison experiment, 
in which participants were randomly assigned the roles of 
inmates and guards.212  Both groups had thoroughly internalized 
their roles, to the point that “guard” cruelty and “inmate” 
anguish led to ending the study prematurely.213  But conditioning 
does not have to be so extreme to yield confirmation bias.  In a 
study by Dan Simon, Douglas M. Stenstrom, and Stephen J. 
Read, respondents were presented with the facts of a plagiarism 
incident at a university.214  Respondents were randomly assigned 
roles as independent evaluators, counsel for the university, and 
counsel for the charged student.  The respondents’ assessment of 
the facts and the strength of the evidence varied significantly 
based on the role they were assigned to occupy.215 
 
207 Id. at 771. 
208 Id. at 793. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 794. 
211 Id. at 795. 
212 Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 69 (1973). 
213 Id. at 81. 
214 Dan Simon et al., Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Investigations: An 
Experiment 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1401723 (last revised Oct. 25, 2009). 
215 Id. at 10. 
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If a person’s perception of the strength of evidence in a given 
case can vary so dramatically based on a mere prompt to be 
partisan, there is much more reason to assume such partiality on 
the part of professionals who spend months and years in an 
organizational culture encouraging certain views and 
discouraging others.  In a 1963 law review article, Justice 
Brennan expressed his dismay with a prosecutorial perspective 
that perceives the criminal process as a “sporting contest,” the 
creation of which attitude he ascribed to the adversarial 
process.216  Ethnographical research done on prosecutorial and 
defense offices confirms that, while both parties are engaged in 
an effort to assess the strength of the evidence, their foci differ:  
Prosecutors assess whether their case is “convictable,”217 and 
defense attorneys assess the value of their case for acquittal.218 
Confirmation bias influences prosecutors and defense 
attorneys not only with respect to the evidence, but also with 
respect to the issue of discovery itself.  In a survey of 
practitioners regarding discovery, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys disagreed over whether discovery proceedings caused 
undue delay in the progress of a case.219  Moreover, when asked 
to report on the risks stemming from improper discovery 
practices, prosecutors tended to highlight the concern that 
overbroad discovery would provide defendants with information 
leading to witness intimidation,220 whereas defense attorneys 
tended to be concerned that lack of proper discovery might yield 
wrongful convictions.221 
 
216 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest 
for Truth? 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279. Ironically, an inquisitorial system, in which 
the jury is not presented with two versions of the truth but just with one, raises the 
concern that the jury might develop a confirmation bias as well and identify with the 
one position that is offered. Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and 
Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 387, 391, 401–02, 421 (2010). 
217 Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, 
Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
531, 541–42 (1997) (discussing the challenge in a segregated society of convincing 
jurors to empathize with a victim of color whose class and life experience may be 
quite unfamiliar to a white middle-class jury). 
218 Emmelman, supra note 92, at 336. 
219 Middlekauff, supra note 97, at 17. 
220 Id. at 18. 
221 Id. at 54. Interestingly, the judges surveyed were split on the matter. Id. at 
19. 
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The above examples suggest, of course, that the problem of 
confirmation bias is not limited to prosecutors.  Defense 
attorneys, too, perceive evidence through a biased lens.  There is 
greater reason to worry, however, about confirmation bias in the 
prosecutorial context.  Not only are prosecutors entrusted with 
the public interest, rather than with the zealous, partisan 
representation of a specific client;222 they are also in control of the 
investigatory apparatus.223  The list of disastrous consequences of 
“tunnel vision” for police officers and prosecutors is topped by the 
possibility of wrongful convictions.224 
V. A COMMENT ON CONFIRMATION BIAS AND INTENT 
The discussion above explains why ignoring the insidious 
effects of confirmation bias can lead to serious miscarriages of 
justice when prosecutorial intent to produce the miscarriage 
cannot be proven.  This could lead to the belief that, when actual 
intent can be proven, there is no problem.  However, the facts in 
Connick highlight another ironic consequence of intent-based 
rules:  Sometimes, it is precisely the positive finding of intent 
that prevents us from remedying prosecutorial wrongs.  Recall 
the facts in Connick:  Justice Thomas’ opinion of the Court, as 
well as Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, did not fail to find 
intent.  Indeed, Deegan, the prosecutor who had originally 
handled the case, was not only aware of the existence of the blood 
test and of his failure to disclose it to the defense, but also 
plagued with guilt over this failure, which accompanied him to 
his deathbed.225  Ironically, Deegan’s “guilty knowledge” of his 
misconduct was interpreted by both Justices as an outlier:  His  
 
 
222 Levine & Feeley, supra note 3. Further many prosecutors resent having to 
take on victim representation roles. Kay L. Levine, Can Prosecutors Be Social 
Workers?, (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Research Paper No. 05-41), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract= 
869433. 
223 John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America: A Historical and Comparative 
Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 1, 15–16 (John L. 
Worrall & M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008). 
224 ANTONIO LAMER, THE LAMER COMMISSION OF INQUIRY PERTAINING TO THE 
CASES OF: RONALD DALTON, GREGORY PARSONS AND RANDY DRUKEN 71–72 (2006), 
available at http://www.justice.gov.nl.ca/just/publications/lamercontents.pdf; Roach, 
supra note 216, at 391. 
225 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 n.1 (2011). 
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intentional Brady violation highlighted the other prosecutors’ 
lack of intent, and, as a consequence, his individualized failure 
negated the possibility of an institutional failure. 
The Court’s reluctance to ascribe Deegan’s personal failure 
to a broader institutional culture could be seen as the general 
tendency of legal settings to distinguish between the individual 
and aggregate levels of analysis,226 but it could also be read as 
another example of the judicial tendency to view law enforcement 
actions as benign.  Good faith mistakes made by police officers, 
even those that suggest underlying systemic problems, preclude 
the exclusion of evidence.227  The recent decision in Herring v. 
United States goes as far as to absolve police officers of guilt for 
mistakes made by other police departments, as long as those are 
merely negligent, not malicious or reckless.228  In Connick, as in 
Herring, one actor’s guilt ironically acted to absolve another actor 
and to satisfy ourselves with a narrow basis for personal 
accountability in lieu of broader institutional accountability. 
In the Brady context, culpability becomes an issue not just 
through an explicit requirement to find intent but also as a side 
issue when analyzing issues such as causation and prejudice.229  
These nebulous situations make it even more problematic to tie 
prosecutorial misconduct to harm suffered by the defendant.  
Short of finding individual malice, it is very difficult to prove that 
departmental misconduct caused a particular harm.  The 
 
226 The best example of this trend, in a completely different context, is 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (declining to overturn petitioner’s 
capital sentence on the basis of statistical data showing disparate sentencing by 
Georgia capital juries based on the race of defendant and victim). The dissent in 
McCleskey pointed out that previous decisions by the Court held that “a death 
sentence must be struck down when the circumstances under which it has been 
imposed ‘creat[e] an unacceptable risk that the death penalty [may have been] meted 
out arbitrarily or capriciously or through whim or mistake.’ ” Id. at 323 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 343 (1985)). 
227 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (“In the absence of an 
allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression 
is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their 
affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence 
of probable cause.”). 
228 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). For more on the impact of 
fragmented policing on the allocation of guilt in police practices, see Aviram et al., 
supra note 148, at 715. 
229 Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 121, 127 (1998). 
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personal-institutional dichotomy encouraged by such intent-
based rules ignores the realities of confirmation bias and its 
origins:  The same hyperadversarial culture is at the root of both 
intentional, malicious misbehavior and run-of-the-mill 
confirmation bias problems.  The focus on the former makes the 
latter, which might be much more frequent, recede to the 
background. 
Focusing on intentional miscarriages of justice at the 
expense of broader institutional problems misses the point that 
the dangers of unintentional or invidious discrimination lie in the 
very fact that it is unintentional.  As such, it is hidden from view 
and from critique.  Even if, as some argue, prosecutorial intent is 
always relevant in assessing conduct,230 the potential for 
miscarriage of justice due to systemic or organizational flaws 
requires broadening our view of causality at least when awarding 
compensation for exonerees.  In that respect, the effects of tunnel 
vision and confirmation bias are no different in the Brady context 
than they are in the contexts of police profiling, reliance on faulty 
evidence or search warrants, prosecutorial behavior during voir 
dire, or any other law enforcement blunder. 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
One potential cynical reaction to my rejection of intent or 
bad faith as a helpful standard in assessing prosecutorial 
fallacies is that blaming a vague “prosecutorial culture” for 
miscarriages of justice fails to place the blame squarely upon 
deserving shoulders, and therefore fails to create proper 
incentives for ethical behavior.  Moreover, ascribing all such 
miscarriages of justice to confirmation bias would seem to 
suggest that no viable solution exists.  This Part refutes these 
claims by suggesting that prosecutorial misconduct can, and 
should, be recognized on different levels.  Section 1983 suits are a 
particularly unproductive way of handling such situations.  A 
proper, holistic approach to the problem should combine 
uncompromising disciplinary procedures against particular office 
holders who displayed bad faith, coupled with fundamental 
rethinking of the systemic features that encourage 
hyperadversarialism, confirmation bias, and adversarial 
hostilities. 
 
230 Id. at 133. 
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Discussions about the efficacy of remedies in the criminal 
context have most often revolved around the exclusionary rule 
and its deterrent function vis-à-vis the police.231  While some 
have considered personal sanctions against police officers to be of 
importance, the consensus seems to be that they are not 
sufficient as a remedy.232  In order to make proceedings against 
prosecutors more effective, they need to include publicizing the 
offending prosecutor’s record,233 as well as downstream 
consequences in terms of case allocation234 and implications for 
promotion.235 
Making the government “pay” in a case outcome is also 
unsatisfactory in the prosecutorial context.  The exclusionary 
rule has been regarded as an effective deterrent against police 
excess in both case law and empirical scholarship.236  However, it 
does not have a direct equivalent in cases of prosecutorial 
discovery failures.  The only equivalent is a well-publicized 
acquittal or exoneration, which does not have a similar effect 
given the rare frequency of its occurrence.237  Moreover, the 
exonerative outcome of a single high-profile, post-conviction 
proceeding, even if the facts of the case expose us to particularly 
unsavory manifestations of prosecutorial conduct, does little in 
the way of consistent monitoring for such practices in the vast 
majority of criminal cases, which are resolved through plea 
bargaining, or, less commonly, in low-profile trials.  As Maximo 
Langer points out in his analysis of prosecutorial adjudication, 
“Nondisclosure of evidence favorable to the defense hinders a 
central mechanism to check that prosecutors do not make plea  
 
 
231 See Thomas Y. Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court 
Taketh Away: The Century of Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 933, 990, 998 (2010). 
232 Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal 
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149, 184. 
233 Gier, supra note 153, at 205–06. 
234 Id. at 208. 
235 See id. at 208–10. 
236 WALKER, supra note 152. 
237 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 231 (2011). According to the Innocence Project, as of the 
writing of this Article, 311 individuals have been exonerated by DNA evidence. 
Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCEPROJECT.ORG, http://www.innocence 
project.org/know/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013). 
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proposals in weak cases.”238  It is this bulk of unknown cases that 
requires solutions that go beyond disciplinary steps against a 
specific malicious or reckless prosecutor. 
The suggested solutions to prosecutorial discovery oversights 
are, therefore, broader and more systematic.  This Article 
suggests adopting intent-neutral compensation statutes for 
exonerees in all states, thereby divorcing the question of 
compensation from the question of prosecutorial mens rea.  Given 
the questionable efficacy of alleviating confirmation bias with 
training in Brady doctrine, this Article suggests reforming hiring 
practices at prosecutorial offices so as to favor potential 
prosecutors who have done defense work in the past, and 
initiating a practice of a “devil’s advocate” case reader who would 
examine a given case from a defense perspective.  Similarly, 
while drilling Brady doctrine into law students and bar takers 
would do little to prepare them to combat confirmation biases in 
practice, law school exams and bar essays can be structured in a 
way that encourages lawyers to view facts from multiple 
perspectives. 
A. Compensation Scheme for Exonerees 
Currently, only twenty-two states, the District of Columbia, 
and the federal government have compensation statutes for 
wrongful imprisonment.239  Other states rely on special 
legislation or, more frequently, on exoneree-initiated § 1983 
lawsuits.240  If one accepts the premise that miscarriages of 
justice by the prosecution can occur as the result of 
organizational culture and confirmation bias, and that even 
incidents of individual malice thrive in prosecutorial Petri-dishes 
of overzealousness and hyperadversarialism, divorcing 
 
238 Langer, supra note 4, at 272. 
239 Jessica R. Lonergan, Protecting the Innocent: A Model for Comprehensive, 
Individualized Compensation of the Exonerated, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
405, 409 (2008); see also Shawn Armbrust, Note, When Money Isn’t Enough: The 
Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
157, 167–68 (2004) (explaining that compensation regimes differ dramatically 
among states and various proposals are being considered for improving the 
mechanism). A thorough discussion of these systems exceeds the framework of this 
Article; the point is merely that guilt-based compensation is inadequate. 
240 For more on the inadequacy of the latter two systems, and the clear 
preference of the former, see generally Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: 
Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 73 (1999). 
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culpability for wrongful convictions from a finding of 
prosecutorial bad faith is the natural conclusion.  The material 
question is what purpose the compensation serves.  In cases of 
exonerees, who spend an average of fourteen years in prison for 
crimes they did not commit,241 the main goal is to help the 
exoneree rebuild his or her life and to try to make up—to the 
extent that money can adequately do so—for the lost years of 
health, employment, education, living situation, and personal 
growth.  Given this goal, the reason for the wrongful conviction is 
immaterial.  Does it really matter, for purposes of restitution or 
compensation, whether the years of unjust imprisonment are the 
product of malice, recklessness, lack of training, or confirmation 
bias originating from prosecutorial organizational culture?  
“[W]hen the exercise of state power results in an erroneous 
confinement, the government whose police power made such 
confinement possible should to the extent feasible redress the 
victim’s injury, regardless of whether any government agent has 
played a culpable role.”242 
Relying on statutory compensation does present a few 
challenges.  One argument is that large expenditures on exoneree 
compensation may present difficulties to legislators who cannot 
budget for it,243 but such an argument can be countered by 
creating a statutory cap.244  Another hurdle might be the 
definition of exoneration; many cases, in which guilt has been 
seriously questioned, including by DNA evidence, do not end in a 
formal exoneration but rather in a plea bargain.245  A hearing 
 
241 GARRETT, supra note 237, at 180. 
242 Joseph H. King, Jr., Comment, Compensation of Persons Erroneously 
Confined by the State, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1970). This notion also avoids 
the need to engage in calculations of comparative fault, which seem to completely 
miss the point by comparing a § 1983 lawsuit to an action in torts and especially 
have the potential for confounding the exoneree with his or her incompetent 
attorney. For the opposite position, expressed rather cynically, see Adam I. Kaplan, 
Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 244–46 (2008). Comparative fault would, of course, 
not be necessary in a non-fault-based compensation system. 
243 Michael Higgins, Tough Luck for the Innocent Man, 85 A.B.A. J. 46, 51–52 
(1999). 
244 Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute for 
Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665, 705 (2002). 
245 Armbrust, supra note 239, at 171 n.110. Recently, Damien Echols, Jason 
Baldwin, and Jessie Misskelley were released from prison on an Alford plea after 
serving eighteen years—Echols on death row—for murders that DNA evidence 
strongly suggests they did not commit. Campbell Robertson, Deal Frees ‘West 
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before a disinterested factfinder for the purpose of determining 
compensation may open the door for compensating in such 
cases.246  Finally, there is the potential argument that no-fault 
compensation fails to deter prosecutors from unethical behavior.  
The above discussion of confirmation bias, which ascribes far 
more incidents of miscarriage of justice to a hyperadversarial 
organizational culture than to deliberate malice, suggests 
otherwise.  While compensation might be an incentive for 
preventing malfeasance in the future, it also serves an 
independent goal: helping exonerees overcome deep past 
deprivation.  In order to achieve the latter, compensation should 
be prospective, rather than retrospective, and should focus on 
helping exonerees rebuild their lives, rather than on quibbling 
about questions of fault.247 
B. Prosecutorial Hiring Practices and “Devil’s Advocate” 
Positions 
The findings regarding confirmation bias cast doubt on the 
possibility of changing prosecutorial culture by training alone.  
There are, however, two other avenues to consider that might 
have greater impact on the way evidence is interpreted in 
prosecutorial offices: a change in priorities in hiring for 
prosecutorial positions and a different distribution of labor in the 
workplace. 
The suggested strategy regarding hiring is to create a 
preference for prosecutors who have been previously employed as 
public or private defense attorneys.  While such practices will not 
eliminate socialization to the new office culture, they will at least 
provide the office with personnel who are experienced in 
examining evidence with a skeptical eye.  Given that, as late as 
the 1970s, most prosecutors in the United States also had a 
private practice in which they did defense work,248 this is a much 
milder proposal than it might seem. 
 
Memphis Three’ in Arkansas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/us/20arkansas.html. 
246 Armbrust, supra note 239, at 171. 
247 This also means compensation should be more than monetary and should 
include help and support in housing, employment, and education. Id. at 160. 
248 Joy, supra note 161, at 409 n.49; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN 
LEGAL ETHICS § 8.9.4 (1986). 
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With regard to workplace practices, it would be sensible to 
place responsibility for training on the shoulders of those who 
have had both prosecutorial and defense experience.  Some also 
suggest assigning a particular prosecutor as “devil’s advocate” 
and requiring that cases be read skeptically by someone who is 
not personally invested in the case and who would be able to 
challenge the prosecutorial perspective on the facts.249  This 
proposal, made generally in the context of prosecutorial 
misconduct, is particularly important in the context of discovery 
failures. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind the high percentage 
of cases in which discovery is an informal process occurring 
between the parties with no judicial involvement.  It is possible 
that if the judiciary were required to take a more active role in 
discovery proceedings, as it does semi-formally in the context of 
plea bargains,250 fewer discovery failures and omissions would 
occur.251 
C. Law School Pedagogy and Bar Testing 
The final group of solutions pertains directly to the issue in 
Connick: the prospect of improving discovery proceedings 
through proper training in law schools.  The discussion above 
clearly casts heavy doubt on the ability to create change through 
teaching of the black-letter Brady doctrine in law school.  
Knowing the rule that requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
is unlikely to make young prosecutors actually assess evidence 
differently in the field.  However, there are some pedagogical 
steps that can be taken to help combat confirmation bias.  First, 
an increasing percentage of law school education is conducted in 
clinical settings,252 and research shows the immense effect of law 
 
249 Bruce MacFarlane, Convicting the Innocent: A Triple Failure of the Justice 
System, 31 MANITOBA L.J. 403, 443 (2006). 
250 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
251 Tempering prosecutorial zeal through judicial review is recommended in 
other contexts of criminal trial. Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics 
Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over the Anti-Contact and 
Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 348–49 (1992). 
252 The Carnegie report has encouraged law schools to incorporate more clinical 
education in the law school curriculum. See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., 
EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 115 (2007). 
Clinical education has also proven to be beneficial in improving students’ reasoning. 
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office work by students on their professional values.253  Being 
under the tutelage of unethical supervisors in criminal practice 
clinics is unhealthy and the potential long-term damage to the 
formation of proper professional instincts and ethics requires 
that clinical settings be carefully monitored.  In crafting the 
academic component of a clinical program, it is important to 
regard the ability to see a given scenario from different 
perspectives as an essential lawyerly skill, to the extent that it is 
not regarded as such now.254  Second, law schools might want to 
consider requiring that students in criminal clinic placements 
spend time in each of the two offices.  Since ideological alliances 
are formed fairly early on in the educational process, it is 
advisable for students to keep an open mind and strive to 
experience the system from multiple perspectives before seeking 
a permanent position as a lawyer.255 
Finally, some changes to law school and bar exam structure 
might indirectly address confirmation bias and encourage 
flexibility of perspective.  Bar exams have been criticized for 
testing rote memorization of legal doctrine and applying it to 
artificial settings.256  Granted, the bar exam itself cannot be 
expected to be an educational tool of quality, and it is designed to 
 
Stefan H. Krieger, The Effect of Clinical Education on Law Student Reasoning: An 
Empirical Study, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 359, 383–84 (2008). 
253 Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on the Formation of 
Law Students’ Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 543–44 (1991). 
254 Norman Redlich, Lawyer Skills Can Be Taught, 3 LEARNING & L. 10, 12 
(1976). 
255 This point was driven home to me rather forcefully when I conducted an in-
class experiment at Hastings, replicating Dan Kahan, Dave Hoffman, and Don 
Braman’s experiment on Scott v. Harris. The students, who had participated in the 
criminal practice clinic prior to taking the seminar, were asked to watch the video 
and comment on Harris’ driving and on the justifiability of police action during the 
car chase. I threw in a demographic variable regarding former clinical practices. 
Students who had externed in prosecutorial offices tended to assess Harris’ conduct 
as more dangerous than students who had externed in defense offices. While the 
numbers of students were too small to conduct significance tests, the anecdotal 
evidence might suggest one of two things: either the students were socialized into 
perceiving reality as prosecutors or defense attorneys during their semester at the 
clinic, or they had self-selected the party with which they interned based on their 
prior worldviews and ideologies. Either way, this suggests the need to balance out 
such tendencies with a more comprehensive placement policy. 
256 Soc’y of Am. Law Teachers, Society of American Law Teachers Statement on 
the Bar Exam, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 446, 447 (2002). 
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only test basic skills;257 the questions must have a clear answer to 
be easily and properly graded, and it would be difficult to 
construct questions with shades of gray in them.  Nonetheless, 
essay questions, and particularly performance tests, can easily be 
crafted in a way that requires bar takers to assess a given 
scenario from the perspective of one party and then take on the 
same scenario from the perspective of the opposite party.  This is 
a particularly attractive choice with regard to performance tests, 
which require the application of problem-solving skills to a given 
set of materials and often involve writing a persuasive memo or 
other legal document.258  Similarly, law school exams, which 
allow for more ambiguity, could also be structured in a way that 
would require students to address the same issue from two 
polarized perspectives and provide persuasive arguments for 
each. 
EPILOGUE: AGENDA FOR A FUTURE STUDY 
While this Article draws on rich experimental literature 
regarding confirmation bias and cultural cognition of prosecutors, 
the specific impact of these phenomena on prosecutorial fact 
perception, while plausible, has not been experimentally tested 
yet.  The discussion here sets the stage for a future experimental 
study that will expose prosecutors and defense attorneys to 
criminal cases with evidentiary materials, to test their 
assessment of the inculpatory or exculpatory potential value of 
the evidence.  Such a study will randomly assign all participants, 
regardless of their institutional affiliation or identity, one of 
three positions: partisanship for either the prosecution or the 
defense or impartiality.  The study will control for the length of 
time spent at the position, as well as for previous positions 
litigating for the opposite side.  The study should also include 
groups of law students who hope to practice as prosecutors or 
 
257 Suzanne Darrow-Kleinhaus, A Response to the Society of American Law 
Teachers Statement on the Bar Exam, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 442, 444 (2004). 
258 See, e.g., California Bar Exam Instructions, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, 
http://www.calbarxap.com/applications/CalBar/info/bar_exam.html (last visited Nov. 
9, 2013). The current format of the California Bar Exam requires applicants to 
complete, among other things, two “performance tests,” in which applicants are 
provided with a “case file” and a “library” of legal resources, from which applicants 
must complete a legal brief, memo, or other such document within the time period 
provided. Id. 
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defense attorneys, before and after spending time in 
prosecutorial and defense offices, thus enabling us to 
differentiate between the effects of personal self-selection and 
organizational culture.  It is hoped that the study’s results will 
either support or undermine the confirmation bias theory, thus 
allowing scholars to understand better why Brady mishaps occur, 
why the legal fault-based standard barely skims the surface of 
organizational partisanship, and how the criminal process can be 
better structured, free of hyperadversarial tension and conducive 
to truthful fact-finding. 
 
